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In this issue ofNeuron, Kraus et al. (2013) show that a population of ‘‘time cells’’ in the hippocampus responds
to the passage of time rather than simply reflecting path integration. This study advances our understanding
of how time is represented in the hippocampus.The hippocampus is required for creating
new episodic memories, memories of
specific experiences along with when
and where those experiences occurred.
Recalling when events occurred in our
past is such an effortless task for us that
we can take it for granted, but until a
relatively recent study by Clayton and
Dickinson (1998), it was unclear whether
animals had a similar ability. In their study,
Clayton and Dickinson took advantage
of a natural food caching behavior of
scrub jays to show that these birds can
remember how long ago they cached a
perishable food item and use this informa-
tion to determine whether the food has
spoiled. This elegant experiment firmly
established that animals could store
information about how long ago an event
occurred, but exactly how the hippo-
campus (and its homologous structure in
birds) encodes time in its representations
of episodic information remains a mys-
tery. It has been known for several years
that relative time in the form of sequential
activity of place cells is stored in the
hippocampal network. For example, ex-
perienced sequences of active place cells
are compressed by the theta oscillation
(Skaggs et al., 1996) and can be ‘‘re-
played’’ during various stages of sleep
and during sharp-wave ripples in awake
animals (O’Neill et al., 2010). Recently, it
has been shown that some cells in the hip-
pocampus represent not only sequences
but also elapsed time (Pastalkova et al.,
2008). These cells have later been termed
‘‘time cells’’ (MacDonald et al., 2011). In a
typical experiment, a rat performs a work-
ing memory task with one important char-
acteristic: during the delay portion of the
task, the rat must stay in one place for
several seconds beforemaking its choice,
effectively keeping the rat’s location con-
stant. If the cells act as pure place cells,then they should be active during the
entire delay period. Remarkably, many
cells are active only during brief intervals
of time, and the preferred interval of the
cell is constant from trial to trial. Pastal-
kova and colleagues (2008) suggested
that time is represented by the fact that
cells fire in a self-organized sequence.
After an initial kick, a set of recurrently
connected cells begins a pattern of
activation that spreads from one cell to
another. In this way, the elapsed time
could be read out by the state of the
network, rather than in the activity of a
single pacemaker or clock.
A critical question remains unresolved
in all prior studies of time cells: can the
time cell phenomenon be explained by
simpler mechanisms, such as continuous
changes in sensory stimulation or
behavior, including path integration? In
the earlier studies, the rat was either
running in a running wheel or free to
move on a small platform, leaving many
variables uncontrolled. In this issue, Kraus
et al. (2013) use a new behavioral para-
digm to examine whether the time cells
are influenced by path integration. In
Kraus et al. (2013)’s experimental design,
a rat ran through a modified version of
the classic alternating T-maze. In the
stem part of the maze, where the rat
must hold in working memory whether to
go right or left, the rat was required to
run on a treadmill. In some trials, the rats
ran for a prescribed amount of time
(‘‘time-fixed’’), while in others they ran for
a prescribed distance (‘‘distance-fixed’’).
Because the treadmill could be run at
different speeds every trial, Kraus et al.
(2013) were then able to consider whether
the cells more tightly locked to time or
distance (Figure 1). Time and distance
are inherently linked (the farther you run,
the longer it will take), but the paradigmNeuronprovides enough of a dissociation
between them to provide a useful test.
Kraus et al. (2013) found that firing of
most of the cells on the treadmill were
best explained by a combination of time
and distance, but critically, a modest
number of cells (8% of the cells that were
active on the treadmill) responded exclu-
sively to time and not distance. These
data suggest that at least a subset of
time cells may in fact represent time
objectively, independently of distance
traveled.
We still have much to learn about time
cells. One fundamental issue is whether
time cells are always time cells or if they
can change to place cells in other con-
texts. Here Kraus et al. (2013) provide a
tantalizing hint. Their main analyses
focused on the period in which the rat
ran on the treadmill, but they also exam-
ined the activity of those cells on other
portions of the maze. Some pure time
cells in the treadmill running also had
what looked like pure place fields in other
parts of the maze, suggesting that time
cells are not predetermined to always be
time cells and can even switch to another
cell type within the same session. More
detailed analyses are required, but based
on these results, it seems that time cells,
like many odor cells (Wood et al., 1999)
or goal cells (Fyhn et al., 2002), might be
place cells that adapt to the specific re-
quirements of the task or environment. If
time cells can switch to place cells over
the course of a single session, then it is
not clear how a downstream cell might
know when the cell is signaling time or
place. One scheme would be to represent
time and distance information on distinct
phases or cycles of an oscillation. Jezek
and colleagues (2011) suggested that
the theta cycle is the fundamental unit
for segregating competing information.78, June 19, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 953
Figure 1. Dissociation between Elapsed Time and Path Integration
in the Hippocampus
During the delay period of a working memory task, Kraus et al. (2013) required
the rat to run on a treadmill for either a fixed amount of time or a fixed distance.
This allowed Kraus et al. (2013) to evaluate whether ‘‘time cells’’ of the hippo-
campus respond best to the amount of time or distance traveled. Their main
finding is that some cells responded to time independent of distance,
indicating that pure time cells exist in the hippocampus. Drawing by H. Fyhn.
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et al. (2013) analyzedwhether
the spiking of time cells oc-
curs on distinct theta cycles
from distance cells. Surpris-
ingly, they found that both
time cells and distance cells
fired on the same theta
cycles, leaving this question
unresolved.
It is also not known
whether time cells appear in
a wide range of tasks or
whether they specialize in
working memory. To date,
time cells in hippocampus
have only been observed in
short delay periods in a work-
ing memory task and have
been proposed mainly as a
way to bridge small gaps in
discontinuous events (Mac-
Donald et al., 2011), similar
to the way that activity during
the trace interval is believed
to associate the conditioned
stimulus with the uncondi-
tioned stimulus during traceconditioning (Solomon et al., 1986). If
time cells are an essential component of
episodic memory, then they should also
exist over multiple time domains, from
milliseconds to hours. One intriguing pos-
sibility is that the representation of time is
topographically graded in the hippocam-
pus in the sameway as the representation
of space (Kjelstrup et al., 2008), such that
cells in the dorsal portion respond to short
intervals of time while cells in the ventral
portion respond to much longer intervals
(Pilly and Grossberg, 2012). Such a topo-
graphic organization would also strongly
support the hypothesis that the represen-
tations of time and place emerge from
common mechanisms. An alternative,
though not mutually exclusive, mecha-
nism is that the hippocampus may repre-
sent the experiences separated by hours
through firing rate changes and partial
reorganization of firing fields in CA1
(Mankin et al., 2012). It is worth noting
that both of these proposed timing mech-954 Neuron 78, June 19, 2013 ª2013 Elsevieanisms, like the responses to odors,
goals, and objects, occur against the
backdrop of a stable map andmay exploit
the same neural algorithms used for the
representation of space (Buzsa´ki and
Moser, 2013). In this view, the representa-
tions of time may be a mere modification
of the hippocampal representation of
space, rather than being coded through
entirely distinct mechanisms.
The brain contains multiple clocks
operating across a wide range of time-
scales, from the millisecond precision of
sensory and motor systems to daily fluc-
tuations of circadian rhythms (Mauk and
Buonomano, 2004). Within this spectrum,
the time cells of the hippocampus occupy
an important middle ground, representing
time on the order of seconds and perhaps
longer. The precise mechanisms behind
the generation of time fields and whether
other structures organize according to
the time kept in the hippocampus remain
to be seen, but Kraus et al. (2013) maker Inc.it clear that time and place
coexist in the hippocampus.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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